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THE INTERNATIONAL PROSCRIPTION 
AGAINST TORTURE AND THE UNITED 
STATES’ CATEGORICAL AND QUALIFIED 
RESPONSES 
Major Christopher B. Shaw*
Abstract: Although the prohibition against torture is a jus cogens and 
proscribed by multiple international treaties and United States law, such 
bans did not prevent the torture of detainees in United States’ custody. 
For a state truly to protect people from torture, it must rely less on defi-
nitions and prohibitions and turn to leadership and policy; proscrip-
tions by themselves cannot stop torture—only leadership and policy 
can. In the case of detainees held by the United States during the war 
on terror, presidential leadership created an environment that allowed 
torture, and it was not curtailed until presidential leadership stopped it. 
Introduction 
 Torture, although once a widely used interrogation and punish-
ment tool, has now largely been banned by a combination of custom-
ary and treaty law.1 The most comprehensive of these treaties is the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), subscribed to by 147 member 
states, including the United States.2 The most significant aspects of 
the CAT are its definition and its complete proscription of torture. 
The ban on torture is so absolute that it is considered jus cogens: an 
international norm so accepted by the community of states, that no 
derogation of the prohibition is ever permitted.3 Yet despite this pro-
scription, people from every continent are still subjected to systematic 
                                                                                                                      
* The author is a Judge Advocate in the United States Marine Corps. The views ex-
pressed in this paper are the author’s own. They do not necessarily represent the views of 
the Department of Defense, the United States Marine Corps, or any of its components. 
1 See generally Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. 
2 CAT, supra note 1; see also Omer Ze’ev Bekerman, Torture—The Absolute Prohibition of a 
Relative Term: Does Everyone Know What Is in Room 101?, 53 Amer J. Com. L. 743, 750 (2005). 
3 See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 153–57 (Dec. 10, 
1998). See generally CAT, supra note 1. 
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physical and mental victimization at the hands of governments, in-
cluding some of the most progressive Western governments.4
 The explanation for this discrepancy is painfully simple: defini-
tions and proscriptions, by themselves, cannot stop torture—only 
leadership and policy can. I experienced this reality firsthand as a Ma-
rine lawyer deployed to Iraq. There, although the definition and the 
ban created a framework, it was leadership and practical policies that 
effectively combated torture. 
 Few dispute that it is torture for a prisoner to be, “bound to an 
inclined board, with his feet raised so his head is slightly lowered, 
have cellophane wrapped over his face, and then have water poured 
over him to create an unavoidable gag reflex and terrifying fear of 
drowning.”5 Yet according to the Bush administration, this interroga-
tion technique, known as waterboarding, did not constitute torture 
and was, therefore, not in contravention of international law.6 These 
divergent views identify a flashpoint in the torture debate: what con-
stitutes torture? 
 Although definitions play a significant role in answering that 
question, leadership, policies and, ultimately, a nation’s commitment 
to humane treatment are more important. A state’s accession to anti-
torture conventions is not dispositive of whether that state actually 
practices torture; a number of CAT signatories have, after all, been 
accused of it. But by investigating a state’s torture definition, one can 
determine if that state actually condones internationally prohibited 
practices. Such an investigation, however, is only a starting point. To 
that end, after this article examines the definitions of torture, the in-
ternational proscription, and the U.S. response, it will show that for a 
state truly to protect people from torture, it must move beyond defini-
tions and prohibitions and rely instead on leadership and policy. 
                                                                                                                      
4 See generally CAT, supra note 1. 
5 See Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, CIA’s Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described, ABC 
News, Nov. 18, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=1322866&page 
=1. 
6 John Sifton, from Human Rights Watch, explains, “the person believes they are being 
killed, and as such, it really amounts to a mock execution, which is illegal under interna-
tional law.” Id. 
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I.  Development of the Definition of Torture 
 The definitions of torture contained in international instruments 
vary.7 Nevertheless, the wide acceptance of the CAT definition of tor-
ture reflects a consensus “representative of customary international 
law.”8 The CAT defines torture as: 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person informa-
tion or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, 
or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any 
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain 
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suf-
fering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful 
sanctions.9
The CAT definition is the most comprehensive and widely used and 
is, therefore, considered the international standard. It establishes a 
cross national norm banning any use of torture. The norm is ex-
pressed and developed in numerous international documents. 
 For example, it has steadily expanded since the signing of the 
United Nations Charter (the Charter) in 1945. One of the stated pur-
poses of the United Nations is to, “solve international problems of a 
humanitarian character . . . [by] promoting and encouraging respect 
for human rights.”10 Article 55(c) of the Charter goes on to state, “the 
United Nations shall promote . . . universal respect for, and obser-
vance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.”11 In Arti-
cle 56, “members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action 
                                                                                                                      
7 See Johan D. van der Vyver, Torture as a Crime under International Law, 67 Alb. L. Rev. 
427, 432-53 (2003). 
8 Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-21-T, ¶ 459 (ICTY 1998). 
9 CAT, supra note 1, art. 1(1). There are, of course, competing definitions. Webster’s 
dictionary defines torture as the “infliction of severe physical pain as punishment or coer-
cion.” Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary (1984). W.R. Kidd, a California 
police lieutenant during the 1920s and 1930s, explained that, “torture may consist of beat-
ings; of long grillings by relays of interrogators under blinding lights; or locking the pris-
oner up in a dungeon without food or water for long periods of time.” Yale Kamisar, Tor-
ture During Investigations: A Police Manual’s Foresight, Nat’l L. J., Mar. 10, 2008, at 22. 
10 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3. 
11 Id. art. 55, para C. 
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in cooperation with the [United Nations] for the achievement of the 
purposes in Article 55.”12 Although the Charter does not specifically 
prohibit torture, it sets an aspirational goal for all its members to 
promote respect for human rights—a goal that includes, by implica-
tion, a prohibition against the use of torture. 
 Thereafter, in 1948, the United Nations adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (the Declaration),13 which states in part 
that, “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.”14 Because the Declaration was a 
General Assembly resolution, and not a treaty, some question whether 
the prohibition is binding or whether it simply creates an interna-
tional norm. 
 That question was partially answered in 1976, when the United 
Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the 
Covenant) declared: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”15 The Covenant 
derives these proscriptions from an inherent sense of human dig-
nity.16 In other words, the prohibition of torture is an inalienable 
right, and not simply a right granted by states. Nearly twenty years 
later, the United States ratified the Covenant with numerous reserva-
tions.17 The most significant reservation states that Articles 1–27 of 
the Covenant, which include the prohibitions against torture, are not 
self-executing.18
 Notwithstanding the limited scope of the Covenant, the CAT 
came into force in 1987.19 It was significant not only because it defines 
and proscribes torture, but also because it creates proactive and reac-
tive tools that parties can use to limit the use of torture throughout 
the world. The CAT is comprised of thirty-three articles organized 
into three parts.20 These articles create a comprehensive approach to 
the issue of torture. Among other things, the CAT provides: (1) the 
use of torture is proscribed regardless of the situation, (2) the pro-
                                                                                                                      
12 Id. art. 56. 
13 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
14 Id. art. 5. 
15 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
art. 7. 
16 Id. art. 6. 
17 138 Cong. Rec. S4781, 4781–84 (1992). 
18 S. Exec. Rep. No. 102–23 (1992). 
19 See id. 
20 Id. 
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scription is applicable to all states regardless if they have become a 
party to the convention, (3) parties cannot extradite persons to states 
where there is a significant possibility that they may be tortured, (4) 
following the orders of a superior is not a legal defense for torture, 
(5) the treaty functions as an extradition treaty for a country that 
wishes to send a person accused of torture to stand trial in another 
country, (6) evidence obtained from torture cannot be used in pro-
ceedings that are adverse to the victim, and (7) parties must educate 
persons, who would be in a position to torture, about the prohibition 
to torture.21
II. The United States and Torture
 To understand the United States response to the CAT, one must 
first understand that the United States has historically supported hu-
man rights and proscriptions against torture through legislation and 
policy. Although several American colonies imported forms of torture 
from Europe, its use in the colonies was far less widespread than in 
the old world.22 The ratification of the United States Constitution 
and, later, the Bill of Rights, further prohibited actions that consti-
tuted torture. For instance, the Eighth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion bans cruel and unusual punishments, and the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments ban unreasonable seizures and violations of due process 
during interrogations. Although these amendments do not explicitly 
ban torture, they do so by implication. For this reason, with a notable 
exception, torture has never been an authorized punishment in the 
United States.23
A. United States Actions Against Torture Prior to CAT 
 The significant area in which government sanctioning of torture 
conflicts with constitutional aspirations, of course, arises in the treat-
ment of African Americans in the southern parts of the United States. 
                                                                                                                      
21 See Johan D. van der Vyver, Torture as a Crime Under International Law, 67 Alb. L. Rev. 
427, 431–32 (2003). 
22 These forms of torture included: drawing and quartering, burning at the stake, 
whipping, branding, dunking in water, and placement in stockades. Lawrence M. Fried-
man, Crime and Punishment in America 37-44 (1994). 
23 Id. But see The Readers Companion to American History 684–86 (Eric Foner & 
John A. Garraty eds., 1991) (noting that African Americans were systematically subjected 
to torture by the southern state governments and the Ku Klux Klan as late as the mid-
twentieth century). 
294 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 32:289 
In response to this, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
The most important provision of this Act is now codified in § 1983: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be li-
able to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .24
Even today, this statute creates a private right of action against federal 
and state authorities who engage in abusive conduct. 
 Domestically, plaintiffs can use § 1983, in conjunction with the 
Fourth, Fifth and Eight Amendments, to hold authorities accountable 
for state actions that amount to torture. By holding police depart-
ments and individual police officers liable, § 1983 discourages abusive 
state action. The Alien Tort Claims Act25 also creates a private right of 
action for violations of customary international law or treaties to 
which the United States is a party.26 In 1979, two foreign citizens used 
this act to obtain punitive damages against foreign government offi-
cials for the torture and death of relatives.27 In its opinion, the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals wrote: “[F]or purposes of civil liability, 
the torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader before him, 
hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”28
 On the international front, the United States ratified the four 
Geneva Conventions in 1955.29 The Geneva Conventions prohibit the 
use of torture in international armed conflict. Common Article 3 
states: 
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including 
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and 
those placed “hors de combat” by sickness, wounds, detention, 
or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated hu-
                                                                                                                      
24 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871). 
25 Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
26 Eric Engle, Commentary, The Torture Victims Protection Act, The Alien Tort Claims Act, 
and Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge, 67 Alb. L. Rev. 501, 502 (2003). 
27 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1980). 
28 Id. at 890. 
29 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
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manely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, col-
our, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar 
criteria.30
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which regulates the 
conduct of U.S. service members, criminalizes violations of the Ge-
neva Conventions.31 Furthermore, numerous articles within the 
UCMJ, such as the proscriptions against maiming, assaults, and the 
maltreatment of prisoners, specifically criminalize acts that constitute 
torture. As evidence of the United States’ commitment to ending tor-
ture, after the Vietnam War, the armed forces systematically taught its 
members the principles of the Geneva Conventions including, signifi-
cantly, the proscriptions against torture. 
 In sum it was among this constellation of laws that the CAT ar-
rived. Domestically, the United States already proscribed torture via a 
combination of statutes and constitutional amendments. Internation-
ally, the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions prohibited U.S. service 
members from using torture in armed conflict. 
B. United States Acceptance of CAT with Reservations and Reaffirmation 
 Although the U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted the 
CAT in December of 1984, the United States did not sign it until April 
1988.32 In October 1990, the Senate forwarded the CAT to the Presi-
dent with numerous reservations. Although some of the reservations 
may have been superficial, one was significant in that it changed the 
definition of torture to the following:  
[I]n order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically 
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffer-
ing and that mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged 
mental harm caused by or resulting from: (1) the intentional 
infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or 
suffering; (2) the administration or application, or threat-
ened administration or application, of mind altering sub-
stances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly 
the senses or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent 
                                                                                                                      
30 Id. 
31 See generally The Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–950. 
32 United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratifi-
cations for the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/cat/treaties/conratification. 
htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2009). 
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death; or (4) the threat that another person will imminently 
be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or 
the administration or application of mind altering sub-
stances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly 
the senses or personality.33
This definition makes torture harder to prove because it requires spe-
cific, as opposed to general, intent. Furthermore, by narrowing the 
definition to include only the acts that cause severe physical pain and 
suffering or actual prolonged mental harm, the Senate left open a 
range of conduct, including physical assaults, which would not be ac-
tionable under U.S. law. 
 The Senate ratified the CAT with these reservations in 1994.34 
Congress then implemented the CAT’s terms by legislating proscrip-
tions against torture that same year.35 In doing so, it defined torture 
as the following: 
(1) “torture” means an act committed by a person acting 
under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suf-
fering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person 
within his custody or physical control; 
(2) “severe mental pain or suffering” means the prolonged 
mental harm caused by or resulting from— 
 (A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of 
severe physical pain or suffering; 
 (B) the administration or application, or threatened ad-
ministration or application, of mind-altering substances or 
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses 
or the personality; 
 (C) the threat of imminent death; or 
 (D) the threat that another person will imminently be sub-
jected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the ad-
ministration or application of mind-altering substances or 
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses 
or personality.”36
                                                                                                                      
33 Cong. Rec. S17486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). 
34 Convention Against Torture, reservation made by the United States (Oct 21, 1994), 
¶ II.1(a). 
35 See Bekerman, supra note 2, at 767–68. 
36 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (1)–(2). 
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 It is important to note that torture, as proscribed by Congress, 
can only occur outside of the United States.37 Furthermore, Congress 
has extended criminal jurisdiction over any act of torture, regardless 
of the offender’s location or the nationality of the offender or vic-
tim.38
C. Leadership and Policy 
 As stated earlier, definitions and proscriptions are necessary but 
insufficient instruments in the prevention of torture; leadership and 
policy implementation are the determinative factors. One example of 
these elements at work is evinced in President Clinton’s 1999 promul-
gation of Executive Order 13107. This order directed all executive 
departments and agencies to, “maintain a current awareness of [the] 
United States’ international human rights obligations that are rele-
vant to their functions and perform such functions so as to respect 
and implement those obligations fully.”39 President Clinton’s leader-
ship regarding international human rights issues created an expecta-
tion within the executive branch that supported international human 
rights and the CAT. 
 In contrast, the Bush administration’s derogation of the CAT and 
other international agreements signaled its tolerance of a more re-
laxed view on enforcing international human rights. For example, the 
administration’s view on the United Nations and international law is 
exemplified by former Ambassador to the United Nations, John Bol-
ton, who said: “There is no such thing as the United Nations. There is 
only the international community, which can only be led by the only 
remaining superpower, which is the United States.”40 Further evi-
dence of the Bush administration’s views on the CAT and interroga-
tions is found in the actions of former Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, who directed military interrogators to “take the gloves off” 
when interrogating John Walker Lindh, the U.S. citizen captured 
while fighting for the Taliban.41
 Perhaps the most illuminating insight into the Bush administra-
tion’s views on torture are found in Assistant Attorney General John 
                                                                                                                      
37 Id. § 2340A(b). 
38 See id. 
39 Exec. Order No. 13,107, 3 C.F.R. 234 (1999). 
40 Roland Watson, Bush Deploys Hawk as New UN Envoy, London Times, Mar. 8, 2005, at 
31. 
41 Richard A. Serrano, Prison Interrogators’ Gloves Came off Before Abu Ghraib, L.A. Times, 
June 9, 2004, at 1. 
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Yoo’s “Torture Memo.”42 This originally classified document, and a 
similar memo authored by Assistant Attorney General John Bybee, 
evidences the Bush administration’s willingness to push the limits of 
domestic and international law during interrogations. Mr. Bybee’s 
memo states: 
[T]orture as defined in and proscribed by Sections 2340– 
2340A, only cover extreme acts. Severe pain is generally of 
the kind difficult for the victim to endure. Where the pain is 
physical, it must be of an intensity akin to that which accom-
panies serious physical injury such as death or organ fail-
ure. . . . Because the acts inflicting torture are extreme, there 
is a significant range of acts that though they might consti-
tute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
fail to rise to the level of torture.43
Interrogators implemented the Bush administration’s policy with re-
gard to suspected Taliban and al Qaeda members, many of whom 
were classified as illegal enemy combatants, and detained in Guan-
tanamo Bay, Cuba in order to render them beyond the reach of in-
ternational and U.S. law. 
 The policies announced in the Yoo and Bybee memos created a 
climate in the executive branch that manifested a shift in values: the 
United States no longer categorically rejected torture; henceforth the 
rejection became qualified.44  
                                                                                                                      
42 See Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., on Military Inter-
rogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside of the United States to William J, 
Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense (Mar. 14, 2003) available at 
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/yoo_army_torture_memo.pdf. 
43 See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., on Standards of Conduct for 
Interrogations under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the Presi-
dent (Aug. 1, 2002), at 46, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/ 
documents/cheney/torture_memo_aug2002.pdf . 
44 One may argue that this analysis is unfair, because the Bush administration, unlike 
its predecessors, had to contend with the September 11 attacks. Even before the war on 
terrorism, however, the Bush administration was accused of unilateralism for its, “abrupt 
rejection of several international treaties, such as the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and certain elements of an emerging agreement to stem 
the spread of light weapons.” All of these policies signaled a desire to not be bound by 
international legal norms. Alan Sipress & Steven Mufson, Powell Takes the Middle Ground, 
Wash. Post, Aug. 26, 2001, at A01. 
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III. Impact of the Bush Administration’s Torture Policies 
 In counter-attacking al Qaeda in Afghanistan and invading Iraq, 
U.S. forces have captured and detained thousands of people.45 Some 
of these detentions lasted only moments; others have lasted for more 
than five years.46 Their treatment has varied from humane to cruel. 
Testimony regarding the conditions within Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq 
is enlightening, revealing that detainees were subjected to “sodomy, 
pouring phosphoric liquid on detainees, beatings, threats of rape and 
electrocution, stripping detainees naked, forcing them to masturbate, 
and simulate other sex acts in public and terrorizing naked detainees 
with dogs.”47 There is also evidence of two Afghan prisoners dying 
from blunt force trauma while under the exclusive control of the 
United States.48 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director General 
Michael V. Hayden publicly admitted that the CIA had used water-
boarding against al Qaeda suspects.49 Other CIA sources described six 
sanctioned “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” used against al 
Qaeda suspects incarcerated in isolation at secret locations around 
the world.50
                                                                                                                      
45 See Carol D. Leonnig & Julie Tate, Some at Guantanamo Mark 5 Years in Limbo; Big 
Questions About Low-Profile Inmates, Wash. Post, Jan. 16, 2007, at A1; Steve Vogel, U.S. Takes 
Hooded, Shackled Detainees to Cuba, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 2002, at A10.
46 See Vogel, supra note 45, at A10. 
47 Bekerman, supra note 2, at 769. 
48 Engle, supra note 26, at 501. 
49 Scott Shane, Waterboarding Focus of Inquiry by Justice Department, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 
2008, at A1. 
50 See Ross & Esposito, supra note 5. The six techniques were: 
1. The Attention Grab: The interrogator forcefully grabs the shirt front of the 
prisoner and shakes him. 
2. Attention Slap: An open-handed slap aimed at causing pain and triggering fear. 
3. The Belly Slap: A hard open-handed slap to the stomach. The aim is to 
cause pain, but not internal injury. Doctors consulted advised against using a 
punch, which could cause lasting internal damage. 
4. Long Time Standing: This technique is described as among the most effec-
tive. Prisoners are forced to stand, handcuffed and with their feet shackled to 
an eye bolt in the floor for more than 40 hours. Exhaustion and sleep depri-
vation are effective in yielding confessions. 
5. The Cold Cell: The prisoner is left to stand naked in a cell kept near 50 de-
grees. Throughout the time in the cell the prisoner is doused with cold water. 
6. Water-Boarding: The prisoner is bound to an inclined board, feet raised 
and head slightly below the feet. Cellophane is wrapped over the prisoner’s 
face and water is poured over him. Unavoidably, the gag reflex kicks in and a 
terrifying fear of drowning leads to almost instant pleas to bring the treat-
ment to a halt. 
Id. 
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 Looking at this evidence, it is arguable whether these actions and 
techniques were specifically intended to inflict “severe physical or men-
tal pain or suffering upon another person within one’s custody or con-
trol.”51 What cannot be argued, however, is whether these acts are hu-
mane—they simply are not, and they certainly violate the spirit, if not 
the proscriptions, of the CAT. 
A. Responses to the Pushing of Limits 
 Reports and photos of conditions in Abu Ghraib spread 
throughout the world, shocking the conscience of both those in the 
United States and the international community. Late in 2004, Presi-
dent Bush made an unequivocal directive, “United States personnel 
do not engage in torture.”52 That directive was followed up with a 
memo written by acting Assistant Attorney General Daniel Levin, de-
claring: “torture is abhorrent both to American law and values and to 
international norms.”53 In 2005, Congress responded by passing the 
Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), which states that, “[n]o individual in 
the custody or under the physical control of the United States Gov-
ernment, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be sub-
ject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”54 
The DTA went on to explain: 
[T]he term “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment” means the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment 
or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Four-
teenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, 
as defined in the United States Reservations, Declarations and 
Understandings to the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment done at New York, December 10, 
1984.55
The Presidential directive, the Assistant Attorney General’s declara-
tion, and the DTA’s language signaled a shift in U.S. policy, which af-
forded greater protection to those detained by the United States and 
                                                                                                                      
51 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (1)–(2). 
52 Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Spells Out New Definition Curbing Torture, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 2005, 
at A1. 
53 Id. 
54 Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739, 2740 [hereinafter 
DTA].
55 Id. 
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brought the United States into greater alignment with the designs of 
the CAT. 
 The U.S. military has also extended and scrupulously enforced 
protective measures for detainees. From 2006 to 2007, I was deployed 
to Iraq as a legal advisor for a Marine unit. During that time, the unit 
in which I served captured in excess of one hundred detainees. My 
duties included ensuring the well being of those detained. Detainees 
were photographed and given medical exams before and after their 
detentions, and their treatment was heavily monitored to ensure no 
abuse took place. Reports of abuse, no matter how minor or trivial, 
were rigorously investigated. Similar provisions are currently in effect 
throughout the Department of Defense. 
 This new reality highlights a pendulum swing after the end of 
2004. Before the Bush administration, the United States categorically 
rejected torture. After September 11, the rejection was only a quali-
fied one. Now, with the Presidential directive and the DTA, the 
United State once again categorically rejects torture.56
B. Why Torture Should Never Be an Option 
 There are a number of reasons why the United States should 
avoid torture. Torture-derived information is unreliable. Victims of 
torture routinely provide specious information to limit or cease pain 
and suffering. Bob Baer, a former CIA officer, said, “you can get any-
one to confess to anything if the torture’s bad enough.”57 In at least 
one instance, CIA waterboarding resulted in questionable informa-
tion that negatively impacted U.S. operations in Iraq.58 Another rea-
son to avoid torture is the human cost. When we think of torture, we 
rightly concern ourselves with the victim of the torture. The torturer, 
however, is also a victim and may suffer psychological harm associated 
with this antisocial conduct. Finally, when any country uses torture in 
                                                                                                                      
56 This movement is similar to the process that the Israelis went through in the mid-
1980s. See generally Bekerman, supra note 2. The General Security Service was publicly con-
demned for using force during interrogations of suspected terrorists and then lying to 
courts about their use of force during those interrogations. Id. After these revelations, an 
Israeli commission investigated the issues and opined: “where non-violent psychological 
pressure induced by intense and lengthy interrogations . . . d[id] not provide desired out-
come[s], the application of ‘moderate physical pressure’ is acceptable.” Id. at 760. The Israeli 
High Court of Justice took up the issue in 1999 and held: “a reasonable investigation is 
necessarily one free of torture, free of cruel and inhuman treatment, and free of any de-
grading conduct whatsoever . . . these prohibitions are ‘absolute.’” Id. at 761. 
57 Ross & Esposito, supra note 5.  
58 See id. 
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defiance of international law, it does violence to its credibility. More 
importantly, such actions lower the bar for international human rights 
norms throughout the world and put more people at risk of being 
tortured. 
C. The Lawyer’s Role in Preventing Torture 
 Interpreting the law is paramount to a lawyer’s job. Former At-
torney General Mukasey’s belief that, “a lawyer’s principal duty is to 
advise his client as to the best reading of the law,” reiterates this as-
sumption; yet it neglects a critical aspect of the art of practicing law.59 
Although clients and society may only want to know what is legal, they 
also need to know what is prudent and what is right. Lawyers must be 
skillful enough to advise their clients on these points. 
 Lawyers’ analytical skills prepares them to meet the challenges of 
legal interpretation. To be effective counselors, however, they must be 
skilled in moral decision-making as well. They should not use strict 
interpretations of the law to limit their advice to clients. Rather, they 
must allow morality to inform the advice they render, too. Law schools 
play a critical role in developing conscientious and effective counsel-
ors. Law students, after all, come to understand how the same legal 
framework that generated “all men are created equal” later came to 
sanctify “separate but equal.” 
 I found myself applying these lessons less than two years after 
graduating from law school, while working on the front lines of de-
tainee operations in Iraq. Both military personnel and lawyers believe 
that military lawyers serve as the conscience of the armed forces. As 
the conscience of the military, judge advocates must provide com-
manders and war-fighters not only with the sound legal advice they 
want, but also the counsel they need. As a lawyer in Iraq, I had to de-
termine the level of care legally mandated for captured suspected in-
surgents, whether undergoing interrogation or awaiting transporta-
tion. Once I determined the required level of care, I viewed it as a 
floor, not a ceiling, for advising what level of care service members 
should be provided. My moral compass led me to believe that the Ma-
rines could provide better levels of care than the law required. I 
briefed my commander on both the legal requirements and my aspi-
rational goals. He, in turn, ordered a level of care for detainees that 
far exceeded the legal requirements and the CAT. 
                                                                                                                      
59 Michael B. Mukasey, The Role of Lawyers in the Global War on Terrorism, 32 B.C. Int'l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 179, 180 (2009). 
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Conclusion 
 The prohibition against torture is not only a jus cogens, it is also 
proscribed by multiple international treaties and by U.S. law. These 
bans, however, do not, on their own, prevent the torture of detainees. 
Instead, presidential leadership and policies ended the inhumane 
treatment. It is the hand of a vigilant administration that curtails the 
torturer’s fist. Laws and definitions are not inconsequential; they pro-
vide necessary theory and guidance. Yet they are subordinate to lead-
ership and policy. Leaders must affirmatively choose to adhere to the 
spirit of the CAT and the foundational principles that underpin hu-
man rights norms. This choice includes a firm commitment to fuse 
the theoretical with grounded, practical procedures, thereby categori-
cally rejecting torture. 
